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Determinate Sentencing and the Rise of Alternative 
Sanctions: Does Shame Meet the Goals of Sentencing 
Reform? 
Kathleen Landis* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The American justice system is failing. Or, at least, that is what many 
journalists and their headlines would have us believe.1 The goals of our 
federal system, including rehabilitating criminals and deterring new crimes 
from occurring,2 are noble and lofty goals. But if meeting those goals is 
how we measure the success of our justice system, those journalists might 
be right. One of the best indicators that we are neither rehabilitating nor 
deterring offenders is the fact that rates of recidivism remain high.3 Even 
worse, there seem to be countless areas in which we can point to the 
injustices caused by the justice system.4 State systems, which typically 
 
* J.D. (2017), Washington University School of Law. 
1. See, e.g., Craig DeRoche, A Failing Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/12/young-black-and-male-in-america/a-failing-
criminal-justice-system; Conrad Black, America’s Justice System Has Failed Us All, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/conrad-black/us-justice-system_b_1110623. 
html.  
2. Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 924 (2007). Simmons 
lists the goals of the criminal justice system as retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence, with a 
footnote addressing what he calls the fourth goal, “rehabilitation,” which he notes has been 
increasingly absent from modern criminal justice. Id. at 924 n.59. 
3. Interestingly, there seems to have been few comprehensive studies to determine exactly how 
high recidivism rates are, particularly at the federal level. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
suggested in a 2014 report examining recidivism rates in thirty states the difficulty in determining the 
exact recidivism rate may be the result of varying definitions of recidivism. Some use a broad 
definition that considers “any new contact with the criminal justice system, no matter how minor” 
recidivism, while others define recidivism as “the commission of a new crime, resulting in a new 
sentence.” The BJS found that at the end of five years following release, more than 75% of the 
prisoners released in 2005 were rearrested, but only 55.4% of those that were rearrested were 
convicted of a new crime. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34287, OFFENDER REENTRY: 
CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 5-6, 9 (2015). 
While the way in which recidivism is defined matters, the conclusion remains the same. The rates of 
recidivism are high, and increasing. Id. at 21.  
4. See Conrad Black, supra note 1 (“Almost everything about the American system is wrong.”); 
see also Ana Swanson, The U.S. Court System is Criminally Unjust, Washington Post (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/20/why-the-u-s-court-system-is-criminally-
unjust/?utm_term=.a86bb3406191 (recounting an interview with professor Adam Benforado, who 
authored a book that “examine[s] and expose[s] the illogical and unfair ways that judges, jurors 
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have the same goals and layout as the federal system, are dealing with the 
same issues.5  
But this is not the first time in history that there has been unhappiness 
with our criminal justice system. In the early 1900s there was general 
discord with the criminal justice system largely due to the rigid and 
degrading nature of the system.6 As a result, the parole system was 
introduced, and with it innovations such as the possibility of a reduction in 
prison time as a reward for good behavior.7 
While the parole system served to settle some of the nation’s concerns 
for a time, eventually it was determined that the new system was not doing 
enough to reduce recidivism, and the reformers once again looked for new 
solutions.8 The Sentencing Reform Act9 (SRA) was the most recent 
overhaul of the criminal justice system, which attempted to address some 
of the problems of the parole system.10 The SRA abolished parole in favor 
of a more determinate system, which established a range for the acceptable 
term of imprisonment for each crime.11 Even more significantly, the SRA 
created supervised release, which also allowed a prisoner to be released 
early, but with certain conditions imposed on his release that, if violated, 
would lead to reincarceration.12 
 
attorneys and others in the legal system make decisions about who is sent to prison, and who walks 
free.”). 
5. See generally Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, & Joanna M. Shepherd, Legislatures, 
Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 1037 (2010) (discussing the parallel shift at the state level from indeterminate to determinate 
sentencing and some problems states have faced using determinate sentencing).  
6. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 976 (2013). The American reform movement in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
was influenced by Australian and Irish reforms. Id. Those reforms were provoked on by two men in 
particular, Maconochie and Crofton, who were interested in increasing rehabilitation efforts by giving 
prisoners more in control of their own fate. Id. Maconochie created reports that “argued that a 
disciplinary system premised on physical abuse imposed with little process or restraint served only to 
humiliate and demoralize offenders.” Id.  
7. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 226 (1993) (discussing the 
introduction of the federal system of parole in 1910).   
8. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised 
Release, 18 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 189 (2013).  
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012).  
10. Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 190. 
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 190-91. 
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While punishment and deterrence remained goals of the justice system 
under the SRA, supervised release was created to put new emphasis on 
rehabilitation.13 However, while incarceration may serve its goal by 
removing the individual from the public and imposing a set term of 
punishment, post-release supervision has failed to remedy the problems it 
was created to fix. As a result, the major goals of the SRA, deterrence and 
rehabilitation, have shown little improvement, and unhappiness with the 
justice system abounds.14  
Some judges and courts have taken the failure of supervised release 
into their own hands and imposed unique conditions they hope will be 
more effective in serving the goals of supervised release.15 This idea has 
included the resurgence of punishments intended to shame or humiliate the 
offender, which had notably been largely absent from the American justice 
system since the colonial era.16 A range of “shaming conditions” have 
been imposed, but a great deal of uncertainty remains amongst courts as to 
what conditions are legitimate, and whether shaming conditions should be 
valid at all.  
This Note will address some of the concerns surrounding shaming 
conditions, and their failure to meet the goals of the SRA. Part I lays out 
the history of the parole system, the transition to the Sentencing Reform 
Act, and the rise of shaming conditions in the United States. Part I also 
analyzes some of the jurisprudence on shaming conditions and finds that 
federal courts have rarely taken up the issue. Finally, in Part II, an 
alternative to shaming conditions is proposed. It suggests judges should 
refrain from “shame” and move towards conditions that encourage the 
offender to become part of the community, such as community service, a 
 
13. Id.  
14. Associated Press, Nearly Half of Millennials Believe U.S. Justice System Is Unfair, N.Y. POST 
(April 29, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/04/29/nearly-half-of-millennials-believe-u-s-justice-system-
is-unfair/. 
15. For example, a judge in Cleveland ordered a woman to hold up a sign during rush hour traffic 
referring to herself as an “idiot” for driving on the sidewalk to pass a school bus. When asked about 
the sentence, the judge noted he “began handing out odd punishments after he started to see some 
offenders who committed crimes return to his court. It is too easy to put people in jail . . . it does not 
deter the crime.” Cleveland Woman Holding ‘Idiot’ Sign Only the Latest Oddball Sentences from 
Northeast Ohio Judges, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf 
/2012/11/cleveland_woman_holding_idiot.html. 
16. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 
1885 (1991).  
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condition that carries a much greater potential to rehabilitate an offender.  
Ultimately, the goals of the SRA, particularly rehabilitation, are not 
being adequately served by supervised release, and the new “shaming 
punishments” do little to resurrect these goals. Instead, a movement away 
from shame and towards community involvement has a much greater 
potential to rehabilitate and deter an offender than humiliation. 
Accordingly, community service conditions of supervised release would 
be greatly superior in meeting the goals of the SRA.   
 
I. HISTORY 
 
A. The Sentencing Reform Act and the Shift from  
Probation to Supervised Release 
 
By 1942, the United States federal government adopted what was at the 
time a growing trend by implementing an indeterminate sentencing system 
combined with a parole release system.17 In an indeterminate system, the 
judge has a small amount of discretion to determine the type of sentence to 
impose, but there is a maximum sentence of imprisonment the judge 
cannot exceed mandated by statute.18 Parole, an integral part of that 
system, was the label for an inmate’s term of post-release supervision, 
served in the community, determined by a parole board rather than by a 
judge.19 Parole functioned as a substitute for incarceration, as good 
behavior triggered parole and allowed the individual to serve the 
remainder of his sentence in the community under supervision.20  
The system of parole had different goals than those of sentencing.21 
While sentencing was intended as punishment or retribution for the crime, 
parole was meant to serve the dual purposes of rehabilitation and 
maintenance of public safety by continuing to monitor the individual after 
release.22 It was thought that parole would also encourage good behavior 
 
17. Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 489 
(1999).  
18. Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 188.  
19. Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 226 (1993). See also Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 188.  
20. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 480.  
21. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 482-83.  
22. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 189.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol55/iss1/24
LANDIS NOTE  9/8/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Determinate Sentencing 247 
 
 
during the term of sentencing, as better behavior was a factor considered 
by the parole board in granting offenders early release.23 
Parole originated in Ireland and Australia in the mid-1800s before 
being adopted in the United States.24 It was created as an alternative to 
“definite prison terms,” instead establishing a system in which an inmate 
would be rewarded for good conduct.25 Parole also created “intermediate 
prisons” where inmates could acquire good marks for “work performance, 
behavior, and educational improvement.”26 Eventually, the individual 
would be fully released back into the community, but he would be 
required to regularly report to the police.27 The police in turn would assist 
the former-inmate in acquiring a job and would continue to keep a 
watchful eye over the individual.28  
Following the adoption of parole systems in Ireland and Australia, 
various American states took notice and began to duplicate those models.29 
In 1907 New York became the first state to formally adopt the parole 
system.30 Twenty years later, all but three states had yet to adopt the 
system.31 Eventually, the federal government followed suit, formally 
adopting the parole system for federal prisons by 1942.32  
Despite the widespread adoption of the indeterminate sentencing and 
parole systems, it was not long before the public began to criticize the 
systems as being ineffective.33 Critics argued that the uncertainty about 
release date was causing anxiety amongst prisoners, major discrepancies 
in sentences were contrary to the goal of equality in the rule of law, and 
ultimately that the rehabilitative purposes of the system were not being 
 
23. See Stith & Koh, supra note 7, at 226. The authors note, however, that the parole boards were 
generally limited to giving inmates credit for only one-third of their imposed sentence, and inmates 
only became eligible for parole after serving one-third of their original sentence. Stith & Koh, supra 
note 7, at 226. 
24. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 487.  
25. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 487. 
26. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 488. 
27. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 488. 
28. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 488. 
29. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 489.  
30. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 489. 
31. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 489. 
32. See Petersilia, supra note 17, at 489. 
33. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 189.  
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adequately served.34 As a result of the criticisms, Congress created and 
passed the SRA in 1984.35  
The reform goals of the SRA were twofold.36 The first goal was to 
eliminate some of the uncertainty that judges and prisoners had faced 
under the previous system as a result of sentences being handed down by 
judges while parole was left up to the discretion of a separate parole 
board.37 To remedy this problem, Congress decided to eliminate parole, so 
that when handing down a sentence, a judge could better dictate how much 
time that individual would spend incarcerated.38 Next, Congress hoped to 
eliminate the disparity in sentencing, so that crimes of a similar nature 
would receive comparable punishments.39 Here, Congress created the 
United States Sentencing Commission, which was tasked with creating 
sentencing guidelines.40 The guidelines would essentially eliminate 
indeterminate sentencing by providing a sentencing range for an offense.41 
Judges would be expected to give a sentence within that range, unless she 
chose to depart for reasons she would need to explain.42  
To replace the system of parole, the SRA created supervised release.43 
Like parole, supervised release was intended to rehabilitate the inmate and 
 
34. See Stith & Koh, supra note 8, at 227, writing that reformers felt the indeterminate system was 
flawed for multiple reasons:  
First, to the extent it was premised on rehabilitation, it was said to be unsuccessful. Second, 
indeterminacy bred anxiety among prisoners because of uncertainty in their release dates and 
because of disparity in the sentences received by persons who had committed the same crime. 
Third, this discrepancy in sentences was said to be fundamentally at odds with ideals of equality 
and the rule of law. In particular, permitting judges and parole officials to exercise unguided 
discretion assertedly resulted in ‘unwarranted disparity′ (including alleged bias against minorities) 
in criminal sentences. Id. 
35. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 190.  
36. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). 
37. Stephen Breyer, supra note 36, at 4 (1988). In explaining how the inequalities resulted, Justice 
Breyer (at the time a Circuit Judge) wrote, “Since release by the Parole Commission in such 
circumstances was likely, but not inevitable, this system sometimes fooled the judges, sometimes 
disappointed the offender, and often misled the public.” Id. 
38. Stephen Breyer, supra note 36. 
39. Stephen Breyer, supra note 36, at 4-5. 
40. Stephen Breyer, supra note 36, at 6.  
41. Stephen Breyer, supra note 36, at 7.  
42. Stephen Breyer, supra note 36, at 7; see also Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 190.  
43. Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 190.  
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help him transition back into society.44 In addition to rehabilitation, 
supervised release was intended to serve the complementary goals of 
deterrence and treatment.45 Unlike parole, supervised release would not act 
as a replacement for time the individual was sentenced to incarceration.46 
Further, the imposition of supervised release was largely discretionary.47 
In many circumstances it was to be imposed only when the judge 
considered whether supervised release would advance the goals of 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and treatment.48  
The statute does mandate that supervised release be imposed in some 
instances, particularly when certain crimes are committed.49 Additionally, 
some conditions themselves are required when supervised release is 
imposed, such as, “that the defendant not commit another Federal, State, 
or local crime during the term of supervision . . . and that the defendant 
not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.”50 However, in more than 
half of all cases, the judge is not required to impose a term of supervised 
release.51 Further, while the statute sometimes mandates that specific 
crimes require the imposition of certain conditions, the statute also “gives 
courts wide discretion to order any other condition as long as the condition 
is ‘reasonably related’ to the factors that courts are required to consider 
when imposing supervised release, [and] ‘involves no greater deprivation 
of liberty than is reasonably necessary′ for those factors, and is consistent 
with Sentencing Commission policy statements.”52 Some conditions that 
 
44. Id. at 190 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983)).  
45. Id.   
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 192-93.  
48. Id. at 193. Scott-Hayward lists the factors as including, “‘the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ deterrence, protecting the public, treating 
the defendant, the Sentencing Guidelines, the need to avoid ‘unwarranted sentence disparities,’ and 
restitution.” Id. 
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2016). See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 193-94 (“The Guidelines advise 
that a term ′shall′ be imposed in all felonies where a term of imprisonment of more than one year is 
imposed.”).   
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2016).  
51. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 192 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2012/2_Federal_O
ffenders_Sentenced_to_Supervised_Release.pdf [hereinafter SUPERVISED RELEASE REPORT].  
52. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 196 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). The statute indicates that 
the imposed condition should be reasonably related to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
LANDIS NOTE  9/8/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 55:243 
 
 
are regularly imposed for offenders on supervised release include regularly 
reporting to a probation officer, avoiding excessive alcohol use, avoiding 
associating with other convicted felons, and submitting to random drug 
testing.53 But occasionally the conditions are even more severe, such as 
requiring the individual to provide a DNA sample, or mandating that on 
request the defendant must provide any requested financial information to 
probation officers.54  
On appeal, judges are held to an abuse of discretion standard when 
determining whether the imposed condition of supervised release is 
appropriate.55 In some instances, courts look to whether there is a nexus 
between the imposed condition and the crime committed or the 
defendant’s specific situation.56 Allowing judicial discretion in deciding 
whether to impose conditions of supervised release, and additional 
discretion to determine the conditions of supervised release, has 
occasionally resulted in judges getting creative with the conditions they 
impose.57 In some such instances, judges create conditions that use 
humiliation as a form of punishment, sometimes called “shaming 
conditions.”58  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). These factors include considerations such as the nature of the offense, 
defendant’s prior criminal history, and the defendant’s educational and medical needs. 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) (2010). Courts have interpreted these statutes as requiring an “individualized assessment,” 
often attempting to create a link between a condition imposed and the circumstances or crime of the 
defendant in an attempt to legitimize the condition. See United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 
1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2015). See also United States v. Cortez Ponce, 339 Fed. Appx. 249, 252 (3d Cir. 
2009).  
53. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 201.  
54. Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 201. 
55. Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for 
Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 75, 90-91 (2000).  
56. See Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d at 1238. This is particularly the case with sex crimes, where 
Internet use is often restricted. When such a freedom is restricted, the courts “require a stronger nexus . 
. . between the defendant's history and characteristics and the sex-offender-related conditions before 
we could conclude that the latter were ‘reasonably related’ to the former, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d)(1).” Id. 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004); Goldschmitt v. State, 490 
So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).  
58. See Massaro, supra note 16, at 1885 (noting that dissatisfaction with the usual punishment 
options “has led to experimental, creative sanctions”). Massaro also notes that shaming sanctions are 
intended to publicly humiliate the offender and attempts to categorize these public punishments into 
common categories. Id. at 1886. The first are sign sanctions, in which the offender must place a sign 
(such as a bumper sticker on his car, for example) to identify himself as a criminal. Id. at 1886-87. 
Second are public apologies or confessions, often published in a local newspaper. Id. at 1888. A third 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol55/iss1/24
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In People v. McDowell, a California appellate court was asked to 
review one of these “shaming conditions.”59 McDowell had been 
convicted of “purse snatching,” and as a condition of probation, 
McDowell was required to “wear leather shoes with metal taps on the 
heels and toes anytime he leaves his house.”60 The court considered the 
condition reasonable, indicating that the tennis shoes he wore at the time 
of the crime had helped him silently approach his victim, and that noisy 
shoes, therefore, would foil any similar attempts.61  
The court in McDowell specifically noted that a condition being “out of 
the ordinary” does not make it unreasonable, and in fact indicated that one 
of the advantages of our system is that judges may impose terms “tailored 
. . . to fit the individual defendant.”62 While the punishment in McDowell 
may have seemed like an isolated occurrence, it is far from the only case 
in which a shaming condition has been imposed and subsequently upheld.  
 
B. History of Humiliation As a Form of Punishment 
 
The theory that shame could be an effective method of punishment is 
not a new one.63 Often shaming punishments are referred to as “modern-
day scarlet letters.”64 Punishments intended to shame were abundant a few 
hundred years ago, with penalties ranging from being placed in the stocks 
 
type of sanction, which Massaro calls “compelled interaction,” may require the offender to interact 
with his victims or those that have been victims of a similar crime. Id. at 1888-89.  
59. People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807 (1976).   
60. Id. at 812.  
61. Id. at 813. The McDowell court also pointed to the fact that this was the defendant’s third 
conviction for purse snatching, and that the crime was committed while he was still on probation for a 
prior purse-snatching conviction. Id. The court reasoned that the tapping sound from the shoes “would 
be a reminder to [defendant] of the fact that he is on probation and that failure to adhere to the terms of 
that probation would not be to his benefit.” Id. Ultimately, however the Court remanded the case to 
clarify the wording of the condition, as they found it was not sufficiently precise as to which times 
defendant was required to wear the tap shoes. Id. at 814.  
62. Id. at 812-13.  
63. Massaro, supra note 16, at 1881-82. Massaro refers to modern day shaming punishments as 
“throwbacks to colonial-type penalties” and relates them to shaming punishments proscribed in the late 
1600s, including being banished, branded, whipped, or placed in public stocks. Massaro, supra note 
16, at 1882. 
64. Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate? 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 756 (1998); 
Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of Shaming 
Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1389 (2007).  
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to being branded with a letter symbolizing the crime committed.65 Then, as 
today, shaming punishments were intended to, “expose the offender to 
public view and heap ignominy upon him in a way that other alternative 
sanctions to imprisonment, like fines and community service, do not.”66 A 
penalty intended to shame requires the wrongdoer to, in some public 
manner, announce or display his wrongdoing.67 The theory is that the 
public admission will cause the wrongdoer to feel embarrassed or ashamed 
of his actions, a feeling he will want to avoid in the future.68  
As shaming punishments reappear in the American justice system, they 
are taking a decidedly different form than those imposed in the colonial 
era.69 Rather than directing physical violence toward the offender, modern 
shaming punishments have typically had the offender publically announce 
his crime by erecting a sign,70 placing a sticker on his vehicle,71 or wearing 
a t-shirt announcing his offense.72 But while the punishments themselves 
differ, the goals of the shaming punishments seem to be the same. 
Shaming punishments, in whatever form, are intended to humiliate the 
offender, in the hope that the public nature of the punishment will deter 
the offender from committing further offenses.73  
A multitude of state courts have dealt with the question of whether 
shaming conditions are valid punishments under the parole and supervised 
release systems. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a 
condition requiring the defendant to erect a large sign in his yard warning 
 
65. See Massaro, supra note 16, at 1881-884 (in which Massaro argues that the United States lacks 
the characteristics required to make shaming conditions effective). See also James Q. Whitman, What 
Is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1055 (1998) (in which Whitman 
attempts to pinpoint the problems with shaming conditions, by examining the social and political 
arguments against such conditions).  
66. See Garvey, supra note 64, at 737.  
67. See Garvey, supra note 64, at 737 
68. See Garvey, supra note 64, at 743. 
69. Shaming punishments were largely nonexistent by 1975, but have “begun to reappear.” 
Whitman, supra note 65, at 1056.  
70. See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding a District 
Judge’s ruling that as a condition of supervised release, the defendant was required to hold a signboard 
outside of a post office stating that he had stolen mail).  
71. See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
72. See Whitman, supra note 65, at 1056. See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1993).   
73. See Garvey, supra note 64, at 743.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol55/iss1/24
LANDIS NOTE  9/8/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Determinate Sentencing 253 
 
 
parents that he was a convicted child molester.74 Additionally, Illinois 
overturned a similar condition in which the sign warned those that 
approached defendant’s home that a “violent felon lives here.”75 However, 
in contrast, the Georgia court of appeals upheld a condition that required 
the defendant to wear a fluorescent pink bracelet for his entire 
probationary period indicating he had been convicted of a DUI.76 
Similarly, a Florida court found a condition of probation valid that 
required the defendant to pay to publish his own mug shot in the local 
newspaper along with his name and a caption indicating he had been 
convicted of a DUI.77 There is no clear consensus amongst the states 
addressing the issue as to whether shaming conditions themselves are 
invalid. At the federal level, however, the issue has seldom been 
addressed, with only one circuit court directly addressing the issue of 
shaming conditions.78  
In United States v. Clark, two police officers violated the police 
department’s sick leave policy by falsely calling in sick, and both were 
charged with perjury.79 The two were found guilty of the offense by a jury 
 
74. State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996). In that case, the court found the imposition of 
such a condition was beyond the limits of the authority of the courts, citing the Tenn. Code Ann. Id. 
Further, the court determined, “[t]he consequences of imposing such a condition without the normal 
safeguards of legislative study and debate are uncertain. . . . [C]ompliance with the condition would 
have consequences in the community perhaps beneficial, perhaps detrimental, but in any event 
unforeseen and unpredictable.” Id. at 87. Ultimately, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not 
address the defendant’s constitutional arguments against the condition. Id.  
75. People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1997). The court looked for specific authorization 
for shaming conditions in the Illinois state code, and finding that there was no explicit authorization 
for “public humiliation,” determined that the condition was impermissible. Id. at 320. The Illinois 
court went further, however, in warning that the sign at issue in the case could have “unpredictable or 
unintended consequences.” Id.  
76. Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). The Georgia court notably took an 
opposite approach when presented with an argument similar to the argument the Illinois court made in 
Meyer. Although the court found no explicit authorization for the kind of condition imposed, it 
indicated that trial judges have the authority to impose conditions they see proper, and the list of 
possible conditions is not an exclusive list. Id. at 794. In fact, the Illinois court decided that absent an 
express indication to the contrary, the imposition of this kind of condition was left to the discretion of 
the trial judge. Id. 
77. .Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The Florida court noted, 
“[r]ehabilitation and punishment are not mutually exclusive ideas. They can co-exist in any single, 
particular consequence of a conviction without robbing one another of effect.” Id. at 656. 
78. See United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990).  
79. Id. at 844-45. Clark received an additional charge of making a false statement to an agency. Id.  
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and given probation by the judge.80 As a condition of probation, the two 
were required to publish an apology for the offense, written by the judge, 
in both the local newspaper and a police department newsletter.81 On 
appeal, the defendants argued the probation condition was a violation of 
their First Amendment rights to refrain from speaking.82  
The court in Clark relied on a two-prong test for the validity of the 
probation decision, first articulated in United States v. Terrigno.83 That 
court wrote, “[t]his test is applied in a two-step process; first, this court 
must determine whether the sentencing judge imposed the conditions for 
permissible purposes, and then it must determine whether the conditions 
are reasonably related to the purposes.”84  
Without much analysis, the court in Clark found that the public 
apology met this test.85 The only factor the court seemed to consider was 
the fact that neither defendant had admitted guilt or otherwise accepted 
responsibility on their own, and therefore the court felt that the public 
apology could serve rehabilitative purposes.86  
Ultimately, it seems that appellate courts at the state level have been 
more willing to take up the issue of the validity of shaming punishments 
than the federal appellate courts.87 But this does not negate the fact that 
 
80. Id. Originally they were given a sentence of three years incarceration, but the judge suspended 
their sentences in favor of probation. Id.  
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 847.  
83. Id. at 848 (citing United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371(9th Cir. 1988)). 
84. Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374.  
85. Clark, 918 F.2d at 848.  
86. Id. It is worth noting that there appears to be some racial undertones or motivations behind this 
case. The officers in question were black, and after violating the sick leave policy, they filed an EEOC 
complaint alleging the department’s arrest quota system was unconstitutional. Id. at 844. After being 
disciplined for violating the sick leave policy, the two filed an additional complaint with the EEOC, 
which is what ultimately led to the charges of perjury. Id. They also filed a civil rights lawsuit against 
the department and their supervisor. Id. Although I do not intend to diminish the gravity of the charge 
of perjury, it seems somewhat excessive that the two were eventually given a three-year sentence. The 
potential racial undertones of this case, combined with the fact that the defendants here did not plead 
guilty, and that this case was dealt with probation rather than supervised release, seems to make it all 
the more odd that the Ninth Circuit would later cite this case as support for their position that a 
shaming condition was valid under the Sentencing Reform Act in United States v. Gemenetera, 379 
F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004). See infra note 101. 
87. See, e.g., State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996); People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 
1997); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.  
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federal district judges still occasionally impose shaming punishments.88 
Because of the lack of guidance from federal appellate courts, the validity 
of these punishments both constitutionally and under federal law seems to 
remain in question, just as the effectiveness of shaming punishments in 
successfully meeting the goals of our criminal justice system remains in 
question.89    
 
C. Humiliation As a Form of Punishment Under the SRA 
 
Although the number of cases in which district judges have given 
shaming conditions seems to be on the rise,90 the circuit courts have not, 
for the most part, addressed the issue. But there is one notable exception.  
In United States v. Gementera,91 the Ninth Circuit formally addressed 
the question of whether punishments intended to shame the wrongdoer 
were acceptable as conditions of supervised release under the SRA. In 
Gementera, the defendant was accused of pilfering letters from a 
mailbox.92  Gementera consented to a plea agreement with the 
government, and was then sentenced by the judge to two months 
imprisonment and a period of supervised release.93 One of the conditions 
of supervised release required Gementera to hold a signboard for eight 
hours in front of a post office that read “I stole mail; this is my 
punishment.”94 On appeal, Gementera argued the condition was a violation 
of the SRA.95 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.96 
 
88. See Clark, 918 F.2d 843; Gementera, 379 F.3d 596.  
89. Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of 
Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1389-90 (2007). Markel notes, 
shaming “penalties [are] designed to humiliate and degrade an offender in public while inviting some 
element of public participation in that humiliation and degradation.” Id. Humiliation, degradation, and 
public participation in those forms of punishment are not the goals of the SRA, which instead include 
rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence. Simmons, supra note 2, at 924. 
90. See Whitman, supra note 65, at 1056 (noting of shaming punishments that “such sanctions have 
begun to reappear”).    
91. 379 F.3d 596.  
92. Id. at 598.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 599.  
95. Id. at 599-600. 
96. Id. at 607-08. In their decision, the Ninth Circuit notes that an amicus brief before the court also 
argued that the shaming condition was a violation of the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, but the court declined to take up these arguments since they arose only in the amicus 
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The court first determined that a condition of supervised release should 
be “reasonably related” to "the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant."97 The court also took 
specific notice that in reading the statute, they understood the three 
legitimate purposes of a condition of supervised release to be “deterrence, 
protection of the public, and rehabilitation . . . .”98 Gementera challenged 
the condition as having the singular goal of humiliation, but the court 
responded that while it may be humiliating, the condition would likely 
have a deterring effect, and therefore was permissible under this prong of 
the test.99 Next, Gementera argued the condition was not reasonably 
related to rehabilitation.100 The court again disagreed, looking in particular 
to Gementera’s criminal history as a failure to accept responsibility for his 
actions.101 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gementera has 
signaled to lower courts that it is possible for shaming conditions and the 
resulting humiliation to serve SRA’s goals of rehabilitation, protection of 
the public, and deterrence.  
 
D. Community Service As a Condition of Supervised Release 
 
While the majority of offenders are sentenced to imprisonment, 
supervised release, or probation, it is worth noting that there are alternative 
sanctions available to judges, aside from humiliation, that are rarely being 
used.102 Like shaming conditions, conditions of supervised release that 
 
brief. Id. The court addressed only the Eighth Amendment challenge, noting “[t]he parties have offered 
no evidence whatsoever, aside from bare assertion, that shaming sanctions violate contemporary 
standards of decency . . . . [T]he occasional imposition of such sanctions is hardly unusual . . . .” Id. at 
608.  
97.  Id. at 600 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553).  
98.  Id. at 600.  
99.  Id. at 602. The court in Gementera cited to the same two-prong test cited in Clark. Id. at 601. 
The Court made no mention of the fact that the Sentencing Reform Act had eliminated probation in 
favor of supervised release, but apparently assumed the same test would apply to both when deciding 
whether the condition was acceptable. Id. at 603.  
100.  Id. at 601-02.  
101.  Id. at 604. Here the court compared Gementera to the defendants in Clark. Id. The court said 
that even though Gementera pled guilty to the offense while the defendants in Clark never admitted 
guilt, Gementera’s plea was “unremarkable” and considering his criminal history, it was likely he had 
not truly accepted responsibility for his actions. Id. Therefore, the shaming punishment could serve to 
inform Gementera of the gravity of his offense and make him feel responsible for his actions. Id.  
102.  Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 591 (1996). 
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require an offender to complete community service are only occasionally 
imposed by judges.103 Unlike shaming conditions, however, community 
service is a valid post-release punishment considered and included in at 
least some statutes, like the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.104 
Although its imposition was limited somewhat by the federal sentencing 
guidelines, community service may still be imposed by judges, particularly 
for less serious offenses and where the offender has a “relatively clean 
criminal histor[y].”105 However, community service is only sporadically 
implemented either as an alternative to punishment or as a condition of 
supervised release.106 Like shaming conditions, community service is 
sometimes lauded as an alternative to a harsh prison sentence and post-
release probation, but it is actually more of a middle ground between the 
two.107  
Court-ordered community service is an “imposition of the obligation to 
work for the community,” but beyond that, there are no set requirements 
for what community service must be.108 Instead, community service may 
 
Kahan notes that although reforms have occurred, the justice system relies heavily on imprisonment 
rather than alternative sanctions. Id. at 605. Kahan ultimately advocates for shaming punishments over 
the use of community service, but his major criticism of community service is that it is “expressively 
irrational” because it “threatens the integrity” of the work of those who voluntarily undertake to 
improve the community. Id. at 629. Kahan also suggests it is perceived as a “slap on the wrist” by 
victims. Id. at 626. However, Kahan concludes his critique on community service by recognizing that 
in a different cultural setting (or with a shift in perception), community service could be a more 
effective sanction. Id. at 629.   
103.  18 U.S.C. § 3583; Martin H. Pritkin, Fine-Labor: The Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work 
Sanctions, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 343, 347 (2010) (noting that despite the benefits, “work sanctions 
outside of prisons are a rarity”); Garvey, supra note 64, at 744 (writing that while community service 
is a “conventional alternative” to probation and imprisonment, “[j]udges, it seems, simply don’t use 
[it] very much”).  
104.  18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(12) (1984).  
105.  Malcom M. Feely, Richard Berk, & Alec Campbell, Between Two Extremes: An Examination 
of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Community Service Orders and Their Implications for the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 160 (1992).  
106.  Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 
236 (2000) (referring to community service and similar punishments as “untraditional criminal … 
sanctions”). See also Kahan, supra note 102, at 591 (noting that punishment alternatives like 
community service are “used sparingly and with great reluctance”).  
107.  Garvey, supra note 64, at 734 (1998) (referring to community service as an “intermediate 
sanction” between imprisonment and “simple probation”). See also Feely et al., supra note 105, at 155 
(referring to community service as an “intermediate punishment” between imprisonment and 
probation).  
108.  See Feely et al., supra note 105, at 156.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
LANDIS NOTE  9/8/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 55:243 
 
 
be tailored to fit an individual offender and his crime.109 Community 
service started appearing as an alternative to “straight probation and 
incarceration” in the 1960s.110 However, rather than imposing a term of 
community service on virtually every offender as is typically the case with 
supervised release, factors such as the nature of the offense committed and 
the individual’s prior criminal record are generally considered before a 
judge will impose a term of community service.111 
For the most part, community service is seen as serving the purpose of 
rehabilitation, but also occasionally of providing restitution or reparation 
for the particular community that was injured by the offender in the course 
of his crime.112 Community service is more flexible than imprisonment, 
sometimes allowing the offender to continue working, caring for children, 
or attending school while completing the requisite hours required for their 
community service.113  
However, community service should not be considered a relaxed or 
easy punishment. In a case study of the Northern District of California, 
where community service is regularly imposed on offenders as a condition 
of supervised release, researchers found that offenders were given many 
more hours of community service than “conventional wisdom [held was] 
practicably possible,” implying the number of hours imposed were so high 
it would seem impossible for the offender to complete the sentence.114 
This indicates that community service is not always a “slap on the wrist,” 
but can sometimes be a time-consuming and difficult imposition on the 
offender.115  
 
109.  Pritikin, supra note 103, at 364 (noting community service “can readily be scaled to meet the 
seriousness of the crime or culpability of the offender...”). 
110.  See Feely et al., supra note 105, at 159.  
111. Feely et al., supra note 105, at 161-62. Feely and his co-authors note that the probation officers 
they talked to in doing their research agreed that community service was not an appropriate condition 
for violent offenders, as they may pose a risk to the community. They also considered factors like type 
of offender and ability to pay a fine (as an alternative to community service). Id.  
112.  Feely et al., supra note 105, at 160-61.  
113.  Feely et al., supra note 105, at 170.  
114. Feely et al., supra note 105, at 206. Feely and his co-authors interviewed the probation officers 
in the Northern District of California and determined that all eight indicated they “recommended 
community service in at least half of the probation cases” and some recommended it “nearly all the 
time.” Id. These recommendations likely account for the high percentage of defendants given 
community service in this district.  
115.  Feely et al., supra note 105, at 204. 
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Despite what appears to be a beneficial condition that judges have the 
discretion to impose, community service is rarely given to offenders as a 
condition of supervised release.116 The failure to regularly impose 
community service may be due to a variety of factors, including the fact 
that some individuals see community service as being an inadequate 
punishment for crime, or that some feel community service should never 
be used as a punishment because we should see it as a social good rather 
than a burden.117 However, these concerns are largely based on public 
perception of community service, rather than the effectiveness of the tool, 
and public perception alone should not influence judges if community 
service is an effective sanction.   
 
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
 
The SRA was intended to replace the system of parole, and to return at 
least some discretion to judges in deciding how to punish an offender. But 
for the most part, judges at the state and federal level alike have treated 
supervised release as a routine part of punishment, removing its 
effectiveness as a rehabilitative tool. In many cases, it is not even required 
that a judge impose conditions of supervised release.118 And yet, it is 
routinely imposed on all offenders, without much thought as to whether 
what imposed punishment will serve the goals of SRA or that state’s 
criminal justice system. Where judges seek alternatives to incarceration 
and supervised release, they tend to stray too far, and begin to impose 
those conditions that qualify as shaming conditions. Instead of routinely 
imposing empty conditions, or even conditions intended to shame, judges 
should undertake to revive community service as an alternative sanction. 
Imposing terms of community service as a condition of supervised release 
regularly and on a national scale will much more effectively serve the 
goals of the SRA than shaming conditions, or even terms of supervised 
 
116. Pritikin, supra note 103, at 364-65 (citing Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate 
Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 127-28 (1996) for the proposition that community service has been 
“the most underused intermediate sanction in the United States”).  
117.  Pritikin, supra note 103, at 368. One criticism of community service is that it is viewed as a 
“slap on the wrist,” while another criticism is that proscribing it as a punishment “‘denigrate[s] the 
virtue’ of those who volunteer to do it.” Id. (citing Kahan, supra note 102, for both propositions).   
118.  Scott-Hayward, supra note 8, at 185-86.  
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release that do not include community service. Further, if the federal 
government adopts a policy that favors community service as a condition 
of supervised release that meets the goals of the SRA, the country may 
very well see an increase in the same condition at the state level, and 
consequently a decrease in shaming conditions.  
Even though shaming punishments have only recently begun to 
reappear, there are legitimate reasons to doubt the effectiveness of 
shaming conditions in furthering the goals of the SRA, and therefore to 
limit an increase in their imposition on offenders. The underlying cultural 
factors that once made shaming punishments effective in colonial America 
will not make them effective today.119 Beyond the risk that they may be 
ineffective, there is a real potential that shaming conditions can seriously 
harm the individual on whom the condition is imposed. Shaming 
conditions often rely on public humiliation, but the public has the 
capability, if not the tendency, to take humiliation too far.120 If an offender 
is required to announce his crime, there is also a risk that the “shaming 
punishments may be disproportionately too strong,”121 and that the shame 
will “spill over” and act as a punishment for the family of the offender.122   
The only positive aspects of shaming conditions seem to be linked to 
their position as an “alternative” sanction that attempts to take a unique 
approach. But if all judges are looking for is an alternative, they would 
much better serve the goals of the SRA, and avoid another seemingly 
ineffective reform movement, if they uniformly began imposing terms of 
 
119.  Massaro, supra note 16, at 1928. Massaro undertook to determine what cultural factors made 
shaming punishments effective in colonial America as well as in other cultures, and determined that 
they were premised on “inflated, ethnocentric, or otherwise inaccurate estimations of likely 
community responsiveness to public punishments,” and are therefore unlikely to be effective, at least 
in the United States, today. Massaro, supra note 16, at 1928. 
120.  Whitman, supra note 65, at 1089 (citing lack of control over the “tendency of the public to 
become either a mob or a collection of petty private prison guards” as a reason why shaming 
punishments are ill-advised). See also Garvey, supra note 64, at 736 (citing Judge Devises 
Instructional Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1993)). Garvey provides a number of examples of 
shaming punishments, including one where a victim of burglary is allowed to enter the home of the 
burglar, unannounced, and take something of similar value to the items stolen from the victim.  
121. See Garvey, supra note 64, at 749, fn. 78 (citing Andrew von Hirsch, CENSURE AND 
SANCTIONS 7 (Clarendon 1993)). 
122.  Garvey notes that the family may not only feel shame for the offender’s behavior, but they 
may also be subject to the community’s scorn. Garvey, supra note 64, at fn. 79.  
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community service as a condition of supervised release, rather than 
shaming conditions.  
There are many critics of community service as a punishment, but there 
are many benefits to community service that even those who seek to 
criticize the practice must admit are advantages to this sanction and not 
others. For instance, community service is significantly less expensive 
than imprisonment.123 Further, the cost-effectiveness of community service 
becomes more apparent considering that it appears the rates of recidivism 
are lower amongst those who complete community service programs 
compared to those that complete terms of imprisonment.124 Additionally, 
community service takes a unique approach that differs from most 
sanctions in that it embraces “restorative justice,”125 as it allows the 
offender to repay his community for his crimes.126 Community service 
forces the offender to participate in an activity with other individuals, and 
to see a different side of the community than he otherwise might not be 
exposed to. Ultimately, therefore, not only does community service seem 
better situated to serve the goal of rehabilitation, it may also better serve 
the goal of deterrence and ultimately decrease rates of recidivism.127  
Another major benefit of community service is that it can be scaled to 
fit the punishment.128 While this is also true of shaming punishments, 
community service is the better sentence overall, since it entails becoming 
involved with members of the public, while shame creates an ostracizing 
 
123. See Kahan, supra note 102, at 625. See also Feely et al., supra note 105, at 201 (“The 
Administrative Office estimates that the average cost for keeping someone in custody is $ 1492 per 
month, whereas the Office of Probation estimates that the average cost of supervision of those doing 
community service is only $ 115 per month.”).  
124.  See Feely et al., supra note 105, at 185-89.  
125. The term “restorative justice” is used “to describe any untraditional criminal processes or 
sanctions that take place in communities instead of in prisons or jails.” Kurki, supra note 106, at 235-
36. 
126. Linda M. Ricci, Focus on: Urban America: Hawking Neighborhood Justice: Unlicensed 
Vending in the Midtown Community Court, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 259 (1994).  
127.  It is worth noting that many articles on the topic discuss fines as alternative sanctions just as 
they discuss community service. But as at least one scholar points out, fines have a slightly different 
implication than community service, namely, that there is a monetary value associated with particular 
crimes. See Kahan, supra note 102, at 593. This also seems to suggest that you may do the crime, so 
long as you have the resources to pay for the crime. Because I find this a particularly compelling 
argument against the imposition of fines, I do not believe it is in the same category as community 
service.  
128.  See Pritkin, supra note 103, at 364.  
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effect. Because community service is an easily tailored punishment, it 
seems best to leave it up to judges to decide what kind of community 
service would best suit each offender. If community service is imposed 
regularly nation-wide, which would likely make it the most effective, the 
justice system would do well to seek out agencies that perform volunteer 
work to see if they would be willing to form partnerships in order to more 
efficiently determine where there is a demand for service. While this will 
require some resources upfront, imposing community service on a large 
scale would ultimately lead to decreases in spending on offenders. It is a 
low-cost alternative to many supervisory sanctions, and could decrease 
recidivism rates, saving money on housing the re-offender in the long 
term.  
As for the public perception that community service is not a harsh 
enough penalty, or that it devalues the work of actual volunteers, this 
perception could likely be turned around if community service as a 
condition of supervised release was regularly imposed nationwide. The 
more offenders that are given community service as punishment, the more 
the people in the community will see those offenders giving back.129 The 
increased participation in the community will allow community members 
to visibly see the criminal justice system at work, which very well could 
lead to increase satisfaction with the system overall.130  
Community service is not necessarily a viable alternative to 
incarceration.131 Instead, it seems a more attractive punishment if imposed 
as a condition of supervised release post-incarceration. If the public and 
federal judges are looking for suitable alternatives to what they see as 
failing punishments, they should look not to shame the offender, but rather 
to rehabilitate him through community interaction.  
 
 
 
 
129.   See Ricci, supra note 126, at 260.  
130.   See Ricci, supra note 126, at 260. 
131.  There will always be crimes that require removing the offender from the public in order to 
protect the public’s safety. Community service is not a viable alternative to incarceration in those 
cases. It may be a viable alternative to incarceration for non-violent offenses, but what this Note 
suggests is that it be included in terms of post-incarceration supervision, which in general could be 
improved by the inclusion of more community involvement.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is understandable that the public, and even judges, have some 
concerns about our justice system and its ability to successfully punish, 
deter, and rehabilitate offenders. However, this concern should not give 
judges unfettered discretion to impose shaming punishments that do not 
adequately promote the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, or the 
criminal justice system as a whole. In seeking out alternatives to 
conventional punishments, community service has a greater potential to 
meet the goals of the SRA than do shaming conditions.  
Shaming conditions in particular may seem like a creative alternative, 
and therefore attractive punishment in the abstract, but they have not been 
proven to actually deter or rehabilitate the individual.132 There is also a 
real risk that shaming conditions could do psychological harm to the 
offender, negating any improvements the justice system may have made in 
encouraging the individual not to re-offend.  
Community service is a better alternative to shaming conditions. It has 
the ability to both deter and rehabilitate the offender, while encouraging 
the individual to get to know the people in the community and to see 
firsthand the problems the community faces. Community service, not 
shaming conditions, should be the preferred alternative sanction if we 
hope to see the goals of supervised release, deterrence and rehabilitation, 
reached.  
 
 
132.  Those who study shaming conditions have not determined conclusively whether they are 
better or worse at deterring and rehabilitating offenders than imprisonment and probation. See Garvey, 
supra note 64, at 753-54 (writing of the effectiveness of shaming conditions that, “no one knows for 
certain.” And citing Kahan, supra note 102, at 638, for the proposition that “no one has yet subjected 
them to systematic empirical inquiry.”).  
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